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IT'S THEIR BODY OF LAW; LET THEM DO WHAT
THEY WANT: THE SUPREME COURT'S
LIKELIHOOD OF RULING THAT STATE LAW
SHOULD DETERMINE CERCLA LIABILITY FOR
SUCCESSOR CORPORATIONS IN ASSET SALES
INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the Third Circuit reinvigorated a circuit split regarding
whether state or federal law should determine successor liability for
asset sales under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).' To appreciate the impact of
this decision, consider a hypothetical based on The Simpsons.2 This
long-running animated series takes place in the fictional city of
Springfield, located somewhere close to Shelbyville and Capitol City,
in a state whose name has never been mentioned. In Springfield,
Homer Simpson works as a safety inspector at the Springfield
Nuclear Power Plant,4 which is owned by the "evil overlord" Charles
Montgomery Bums.5 Suppose that after eating dozens of doughnuts
one day, Homer carelessly falls asleep at the controls and fails to
notice a substantial amount of radioactive waste seep into the soil at
the plant.6 A few weeks later, Mr. Bums finally decides to retire and
move to an unknown location after selling the Springfield plant to a
corporation, aptly named Nuclear Successor Corporation. 7 Several
months later, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) discovers
1. United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005). CERCLA is codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
2. The Simpsons (FOX Broadcasting Company).
3. Wikipedia, Springfield (The Simpsons), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Springfield_(The_
Simpsons) (last visited Nov. 21, 2006).
4. The Simpsons, Homer J. Simpson, http://www.thesimpsons.com/characters/home.htm (last
visited Nov. 21, 2006).
5. The Simpsons, Charles Montgomery Burns, http://www.thesimpsons.com/characters/home.htm
(last visited Nov. 21, 2006).
6. Cf Gen. Battery, 423 F.3d at 296-97, 305-09 (finding a successor corporation liable where it
acquired a small, privately-held battery manufacturer which had contributed to lead contamination
because the acquisition constituted a de facto merger).
7. Id.
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the radioactive spill and cleans up the mess pursuant to a federal
statute.
8
After the cleanup, assume that the EPA decides to seek
reimbursement for Homer's oversight as provided by the same
federal statute. 9 With Mr. Bums gone, the EPA could target the vast
resources of Nuclear Successor Corporation. 10 However, the EPA
will first have to know whether state corporate law or a federal
uniform rule will determine if it can sue Nuclear Successor Corpora-
tion.11 Currently, the answer to this question depends on the circuit in
which this fictional city of Springfield is located. 12 If the town is
Springfield, Massachusetts, then the law of Massachusetts will
control. 13 However, if it is Springfield, New Jersey, then a national
uniform rule would determine Nuclear Successor Corporation's
liability. 14 Thus, until the United States Supreme Court decides
whether state or federal law should determine whether Nuclear
Successor Corporation may be liable for Homer's act, or until The
Simpsons reveals which state Springfield is located in, the EPA's
question will remain unanswered. While this hypothetical may
seem silly, the problem that it illustrates is real, and it is one on which
the circuits are split:16 Should state law or federal law determine a
successor corporation's liability under CERCLA?
17
8. See infra text accompanying notes 24-25.
9. See infra text accompanying note 25.
10. See Gen. Battery, 423 F.3d at 298 n.3 (noting that "[t]he courts of appeals that have addressed
the issue are unanimous in recognizing successor liability under CERCLA.").
11. See discussion infra Part III.
12. See discussion infra Part II.
13. The First Circuit has held that state law should determine successor liability. United States v.
Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 54 (lst Cir. 2001) (noting "[w]e have concluded that the majority rule is to apply
state law 'so long as it is not hostile to the federal interests animating CERCLA,' and have applied
Massachusetts contracts law to determine an issue of successor liability" (quoting John S. Boyd Co., Inc.
v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 406 (1st Cir. 1993))).
14. The Third Circuit has held that a uniform federal standard is appropriate to determine CERCLA
successor liability. Gen. Battery, 423 F.3d at 303-04.
15. New York v. Nat'l Serv. Indus., 460 F.3d 201, 207-08 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting the current circuit
split on whether successor liability should be determined by state law or a national uniform standard).
16. For example, the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits have held that state law determines
CERCLA liability for successor corporation. However, the Third and Fourth circuits have held that a
national, uniform rule should determine such liability. Id. at 208.
17. See id.
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HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 562 2007-2008
562  I    L  
ti    
 8 
  
t   
 rn  
  lo  
   
 r 
1    
    
tts,   
    
nn l r r r tion's 
ility.14    
 r 
 '   
 's 
15 i l  
  
  
ti 's liability under CERCLA?17 
 i   
 i   
.  . ,  .    .   )   
  
II.  i i  i f  rt III. 
.  I. 
.  i t i it  l  t t t t  l  l    .   . 
i ,  .  I,  1 t i . ) )   
'   ,'  
 i   
. t   .,  .  ,  t i . »). 
.     
 . . tt ry,  .   -{) . 
.   . ' rvo ,  
i    
.  l ,  , , ,       
 li ilit  f r  ti . r, t  i   t  i it   l  t t  
ti l, i  l  l  t i    . 
. e  
2
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol24/iss2/7
STATE LAW AND CERCLA LIABILITY
This Note will discuss the choice of law issue surrounding the in
imposition of successor liability under CERCLA. Part I provides
background on the statute and the different approaches that jurisdic-
tions use to impose successor liability.'8 Next, Part II analyzes the
influential Supreme Court decisions regarding choice of law, which
have provided the necessary framework for approaching the issue at
hand. 19 Part III then applies these prior Supreme Court decisions to
CERCLA and successor liability and concludes that if presented with




A. A Brief Overview of CERCLA
In 1980, the United States Congress passed CERCLA.2' The
statute "was designed 'to bring order to the array of partly redundant,
partly inadequate federal hazardous substances cleanup and compen-
sation laws.' 22 Its purpose was "to initiate and establish a
comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and
control the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive
hazardous waste disposal sites."
23
CERCLA primarily concerns emergency responses to spills and
the cleanup of leaking sites, which are either inactive or abandoned,24
and it provides the federal government with various remedies. 25 For
instance, the statute established the Superfund, which provides the
necessary money for cleanups when the responsible party cannot be
18. See discussion infra Part I.
19. See discussion infra Part I1.
20. See discussion infra Part HI.
21. 34 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 2 (1995).
22. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting FREDERICK
ANDERSON ET AL., ENvtRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 568 (1984)).
23. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1241 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting United
States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1500 (6th Cir. 1989)).
24. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1040.
25. Id. at 1041.
20071
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identified or if private resources are insufficient.26 Further, CERCLA
permits the issuance of injunctions to force parties to clean up spills,
or the EPA may cleanup a site and then sue the responsible party for
reimbursement for the costs. 27 Thus, CERCLA seeks "to ensure that
'everyone who is potentially responsible for hazardous-waste
contamination may be forced to contribute to the costs of cleanup."'
28
Accordingly, CERCLA litigation has focused primarily on who
should pay for the cost of cleanup at these sites, and within these
disputes, parties have argued intensely over the liability of successor
corporations.
29
B. The CERCLA Cause ofAction
"[A]ny 'person' who owned or operated a facility at the time of
disposal of hazardous waste" is liable under CERCLA. 30 For
purposes of this liability, a corporation is a person.3' A CERCLA
cause of action has five elements:
(1) the site is a facility; (2) there has been a release or threatened
release of hazardous substances from that facility; (3) the
defendant is within one of the four categories of covered persons;
(4) U.S. EPA has incurred costs in responding to the release; and
(5) those costs are consistent with the National Contingency Plan
32
In addition, CERCLA provides for strict liability.33 Accordingly,
the government does not have to prove that a corporation was
26. Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1242.
27. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1041.
28. United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 297-98 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States
v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 56 n.1 (1998)).
29. 34 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 2 (1995).
30. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9607 (a)(2) (1988)).
31. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988)).
32. 68 AM. JUR. Trials § 13 (1998) (citing Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985)).
33. 34 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 2 (1995).
[Vol. 24:561
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STATE LAW AND CERCLA LIABILITY
negligent or even caused the release. 34 Rather, it must show only
"that a hazardous substance was 'released' at the site."
35
C. Successor Liability
Because CERCLA was a quickly passed "eleventh hour com-
promise," 36 the statute was not clearly or precisely drafted, and
"successor liability is one of its puzzles." 37 As a result, courts have
been forced to define many of the CERCLA provisions. 38  For
example, while the statute does not expressly provide that successor
corporations may be liable for their predecessor corporations, courts
have unanimously inferred that CERCLA provides for such liability.39
Successor liability is a universally accepted legal doctrine4 ° that imposes
the liabilities of a parent corporation on its successor corporation in a
merger.4 1 However, in an asset sale, a successor corporation will
ordinarily not assume the liabilities of the company that sold its
42assets. Nonetheless, this rule of precluding liability does have
"universally recognized exceptions. 4a3 These four general exceptions
impose liability when: "(1) the successor expressly or impliedly
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 68 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (1998) (quoting Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1040); see also Smith Land &
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting "[i]t is not surprising that,
as a hastily conceived and briefly debated piece of legislation, CERCLA failed to address many
important issues, including corporate successor liability.").
37. United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2005).
38. 68 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (1998).
39. See Gen. Battery, 423 F.3d at 298 n.3 (noting that "[t]he courts of appeals that have addressed
the issue are unanimous in recognizing successor liability under CERCLA."); see also United States v.
Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that CERCLA encompasses
successor liability because the statute imposes liability on any person who owned or operated a facility
at the time of disposal, and person is defined by the statute).
40. See Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 922 F.2d 1240, 1246 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting "counsel
for the defendants agreed that so far as he knew, all jurisdictions recognize the doctrine of successor
corporate liability. The universal acceptance of this rule cannot be gainsaid.").
41. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS § 4.3, at 160 (2003); see also ROBERT
W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 306 (9th ed. 2005).
42. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992); BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 41.
43. 14 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 6769, at 368 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2003).
20071
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agrees to assume the liabilities of the predecessor; (2) the transaction
may be considered a de facto merger; (3) the successor may be
considered a 'mere continuation' of the predecessor; or (4) the
transaction is fraudulent.
' 4
In fact, the Third Circuit, which held that a federal uniform
standard should determine CERCLA liability, specifically recognized
these exceptions to non-liability for acquiring corporations. 45 More-
over, a few states employ "more expansive but far less universally
recognized exceptions, such as the 'continuity of enterprise'
exception." 46 This test "focus[es] more on continuation of the
business enterprise rather than on continuation of the corporate
entity.' '47 The continuity of enterprise exception considers various
factors, including:
(1) retention of the same employees; (2) retention of the same
supervisory personnel; (3) retention of the same production
facilities in the same location; (4) production of the same
product; (5) retention of the same name; (6) continuity of assets;
(7) continuity of general business operations; and (8) whether the
successor holds itself out as the continuation of the previous
enterprise.
48
However, despite these differences between the traditional and more
expansive exceptions providing for successor liability in asset sales,
the end result pertaining to liability is sometimes not substantially
different.49
44. Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 838.
45. United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 303-06 (3d Cir. 2005).
46. FLETCHER, supra note 43.
47. Id. at 369.
48. Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 838.
49. FLETCHER, supra note 43.
[Vol. 24:561
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STATE LAW AND CERCLA LIABILITY
D. The Conflict in Law
In addition to its failure to specify criteria for successor liability,
CERCLA also fails to expressly provide whether state law or a
uniform national rule should determine whether a successor
corporation is liable in an asset sale. 50 This omission has led to an
unresolved choice of law issue. 51 Because corporations are formed
under state law, state law has traditionally governed their formation,
dissolution, and continuing liability.52 In fact, "[n]o principle of
corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State's
authority to regulate [its] domestic corporations . . . ,,53 A state's
power to create and define a corporation necessarily encompasses the
determination of what constitutes a succession to or continuation of
that corporation, as the corporation's "very existence and attributes
are a product of [that state's] law." 54 Further, courts are particularly
reluctant to displace state law with federal rules "because business
decisions typically proceed in reliance on the applicable state
standards. 55
Despite this reliance on state law, CERCLA is a federal statute that
specifically provides for a corporation's liability.56 "Consequently,
the rights and liabilities created by CERCLA are governed by federal
law. The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that controversies
governed by federal law 'do not inevitably require resort to uniform
federal rules. " 57 Accordingly, should federal law, which provides the
EPA with a cause of action against corporations under CERCLA,
50. See discussion infra Part Hll.
51. See United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298-99 (3d Cir. 2005).
52. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 363 (9th Cir.
1998).
53. Gregory C. Sisk & Jerry L. Anderson, The Sun Sets on Federal Common Law: Corporate
Successor Liability Under CERCLA After O'Melveny & Meyers, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 505, 552-53
(1997) (quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987)).
54. Id.
55. Gen. Battery, 423 F.3d at 299.
56. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1500-01 (11th Cir. 1996)
(holding that state partnership law determines a limited partner's liability under CERCLA "[a]bsent a
showing that state partnership law is inadequate to achieve the goals of CERCLA . ) (citations
omitted).
57. Id. at 1500 (citations omitted).
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override state law, which creates and governs corporations, to define
when successor corporations may be liable for their parents?
II. PAINTING THE BACKDROP: THE SUPREME COURT'S APPLICABLE
CHOICE OF LAW JURISPRUDENCE
Besides not expressly providing for successor liability, CERCLA
fails to state whether state law or a uniform national rule should
determine whether a successor corporation is liable in an asset sale.58
While the Supreme Court has not addressed whether state law or a
uniform national rule should determine CERCLA liability for
successor corporations, it has addressed applicable choice of law
issues involving other ambiguous federal statutes.59
A. The Presumption of State Law in the Absence of a Clear
Congressional Directive
When determining whether a federal statute displaces state law, the
Supreme Court will "not contradict an explicit federal statutory
provision." 60 However, the Court has consistently held that when
Congress fails to explicitly provide for this displacement in
comprehensive and detailed statutes, it will presume that the
unaddressed matters should be left to state law.61 The Court has
reasoned that Congress, rather than courts, should decide where to
displace state law because "Congress acts.. . against the background
of the total corpus juris of the states . .,62 Ruling otherwise would
create additional "federal common law," which would not supple-
ment but alter the statutory scheme in place.63 Accordingly, if a
federal statute lacks a clear congressional directive, state law will be
presumed, and the Court will weigh certain factors to determine
58. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17; discussion infra Part III.
59. See Gen. Battery, 423 F.3d at 299.
60. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79,85 (1994).
61. Id.
62. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (citations omitted).
63. O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 87.
[Vol. 24:561
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STATE LAW AND CERCLA LIABILITY
whether displacement of state law is appropriate. 64 These factors have
become known as the Kimbell Foods test.
65
B. A Test is Born: The Kimbell Foods Approach to Conflict in Law
In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,6 6 the Supreme Court
considered whether the contractual liens of federal loan programs
took precedence over private liens when the federal statutes that
authorized these federal programs failed to specify priority rules.
67
The Court held "absent a congressional directive, the relative priority
of private liens and consensual liens arising from these Government
lending programs is to be determined under nondiscriminatory state
laws.",68 It refused to create a national uniform standard because the
state's priority laws "furnish[ed] convenient solutions in no way
inconsistent with adequate protection of the federal interest[s].',69 The
Court noted that where a statute does not provide for the applicable
law, "[w]hether to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide federal
rule is a matter of judicial policy 'dependent upon a variety of
considerations always relevant to the nature of the specific
governmental interests and to the effects upon them of applying state
law."
70
Moreover, the Court considered three factors to determine which
law to apply.71 First, "[u]ndoubtedly, federal programs that 'by their
nature are and must be uniform in character throughout the Nation'
necessitate formulation of controlling federal rules."72 Second, courts
should consider "whether application of state law would frustrate
specific objectives of the federal programs. 73 Third, courts "must
64. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 363 (9th Cir.
1998).
65. Id.
66. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
67. Id. at 718.
68. Id. at 740.
69. Id. at 729 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309 (1947)).
70. Id. at 728 (quoting Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 310).
71. Id.
72. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 728 (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354 (1966)).
73. Id.
20071
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consider the extent to which application of a federal rule would
disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law."
74
Since Kimbell Foods, the Supreme Court has consistently applied
this three-factor test to determine whether a national uniform rule
should be applied to disputes that would otherwise be governed by
state law. 75 Likewise, lower courts have applied this test to resolve
whether a federal rule should govern corporate liability, including a
successor corporation's CERCLA liability resulting from an asset
sale.76 However, their analyses have led to different conclusions,
thereby creating the current circuit split as to whether state law or
federal law should determine CERCLA successor liability for asset
sales.77
C. A Few Good Instances: The Supreme Court's Reluctance to
Displace State Law
In 1994, the Supreme Court affirmatively reemphasized its prior
reluctance to displace state law in O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC.78 In
O'Melveny, the Court held that a uniform federal rule would not be
justified to determine whether knowledge of a bank's fraudulent
conduct should be imputed to the FDIC.79 Pursuant to a federal
statute, the FDIC, which was the insurer of a bank, became the
bank's receiver upon its insolvency, and thus succeeded to all of the
bank's "rights, titles, powers and privileges." 80 This particular bank
had engaged in various fraudulent activities, which prompted
investors in a real estate syndication to demand refunds from the
FDIC.81 Consequently, the FDIC brought state claims of professional
74. Id. at 729.
75. See discussion infra Part II.C.
76. See discussion infra Part Ill.
77. See discussion infra Part III. Compare United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 2001)
(holding that state law determines CERCLA liability), with United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423
F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that federal rule determines CERCLA liability).
78. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
79. Id. at 85.
80. Id. at 86 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(dX2XA)(i) (1988)).
81. Id. at 82.
[Vol. 24:561
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STATE LAW AND CERCLA LIABILITY
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against the law firm that had
82represented the bank. However, under California law "any defense
good against the original party is good against the receiver," so the
firm argued that the bank's knowledge of the fraudulent conduct
83should have been imputed to the FDIC. The FDIC responded that a
national uniform rule to decide the validity of the imputation of
knowledge defense was appropriate because of the high federal
interest implicated in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).
8 4
The Court held that a national rule was unwarranted, and it noted
that such cases were "few and restricted"8 5 and "limited to situations
where there is a 'significant conflict between some federal policy or
interest and the use of state law.' ' 8 6 The FDIC's argument failed
because it "identified no significant conflict with an identifiable
federal policy or interest."
87
Nearly three years after O'Melveny, in Atherton v. FDIC, the
Supreme Court faced another choice of law issue concerning the
same federal statute and the FDIC.88 Again, the Court emphasized the
need to show an identifiable federal interest that specifically conflicts
with state law in order to justify a uniform federal rule. 89 The FDIC
sued the directors of a bank for gross negligence, simple negligence,
and breaches of fiduciary duty.90 The bank had made "various bad
development, construction, and business acquisition loans." 91
However, FIRREA only provided the FDIC with "gross negligence"
causes of action.92 The defendants argued that because the statute
only provided for liability based on "gross negligence or more
82. Id.
83. Id. at 86 (quoting FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 751 (9th Cir. 1992)).
84. O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 86.
85. Id. at 87 (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)).
86. Id. (quoting Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63,68 (1966)).
87. Id. at 88.
88. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997).
89. Id. at218-19
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seriously culpable conduct, the statute intended to forbid actions
based upon less seriously culpable conduct, such as . .. simple
negligence." 93 However, the Court held that the federal statute sets
the floor, and so state law establishes the requisite standards of care
for corporate officers, provided they are stricter than the federal
statute.
94
In sum, Kimbell Foods, and its application in O'Melveny and
Atherton, has provided the framework for determining whether state
law or a uniform federal rule should define a party's liability under a
federal statute. 95 While the circuits consistently apply this framework
to resolve CERCLA liability for successor corporations in asset sales,
their applications have differed and so have their results. 96 Therefore,
when confronted with this issue, the Supreme Court will likely apply
this framework and finally decide which application is correct.
97
III. KEEP YOUR HANDS OFF THEIR BODY OF LAW: THE SUPREME
COURT'S LIKELY CONCLUSION THAT STATE LAW SHOULD CONTROL
CERCLA SUCCESSOR LIABILITY ARISING FROM ASSET SALES
In applying the Kimbell Foods test, the circuits are split as to
whether state law applies or whether a uniform national rule should
be developed to determine successor liability under CERCLA for
asset sale transactions. 98 The "majority rule [amongst the circuits who
have considered the issue] is to apply state law 'so long as it is not
hostile to the federal interests animating CERCLA' . . . .99
Nonetheless, the split persists, and the Supreme Court should decide
which law applies, so that the EPA will know whom to sue and
corporations will know the extent of their environmental liability. If
93. Id.
94. Atherton, 519 U.S. at 216.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 61-95.
96. See discussion infra Part III.
97. See discussion supra Part I.
98. See generally New York v. Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 207-08 (2d Cir. 2006).
99. United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 54 (lst Cir. 2001).
[Vol. 24:561
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STATE LAW AND CERCLA LIABILITY
the Court finally confronts this issue, the Kimbell Foods test suggests
that it will likely rule that state law should apply.'
00
A. The Absence of a Clear Congressional Directive
When deciding whether state law or a federal rule should apply,
courts should first see "whether Congress intended federal judges to
develop their own rules or to incorporate state law."' 01 If there is no
congressional directive, then a court should use the Kimbell three-part
test. 0 2  Supporters claim that a quote by CERCLA's primary
congressional sponsor provides such a directive. 10 3  Former
Representative James Florio stated, "[t]o insure the development of
law, and to discourage business dealings in hazardous substances
from locating primarily in States with more lenient laws, the bill will
encourage the further development of a Federal common law in this
area."9
104
However, while CERCLA's sponsor voiced support for a national
uniform standard, "[t]he personal conclusions of one member of
Congress, even a sponsor, are not owed weight in the absence of any
support in the statutory text or authoritative committee reports."' 0 5 In
the alternative, if this "meager legislative history" manifested
Congress's intent to impose a national uniform rule for successor
liability, 10 6 this legislative history is insufficient to overcome the
100. See discussion supra Part II.
101. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir.
1998) (quoting Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1457-58 (9th Cir. 1986)).
102. See id. at 362-63.
103. David C. Clarke, Note, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: A Federal Common Law Approach,
58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1300, 1312 (1990) (quoting 126 CONG. REc. 31,965 (1980)).
104. Id.
105. Sisk & Anderson, supra note 53, at 528 (citing Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S.
443, 474 (1921), which states that legislative debates are "expressive of the views and motives of
individual members ... and hence may not be resorted to... in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of
the lawmaking body," and Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118
(1980), which notes that "ordinarily even the contemporaneous remarks of a single legislator who
sponsors a bill are not controlling in analyzing legislative history.").
106. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The meager
legislative history available indicates that Congress expected the courts to develop a federal common
law to supplement the statute.") (agreeing with and quoting Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v.
Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cit. 1988)).
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O'Melveny presumption that unaddressed matters in comprehensive
and detailed federal statutes are subject to state law.'1 7 After the
Supreme Court decision in O'Melveny, the Ninth Circuit recognized
this principle by abrogating its prior decision in Louisiana-Pacific
Corp. v. Asarco, Inc.10 8 More specifically in Atchison, the court noted
that Louisiana Pacific "recognized that Congress did not address the
particular issue of successor liability under CERCLA."' 9
B. Applying the Kimbell Foods Test
1. Whether the Federal Program Requires Uniformity
The goal of CERCLA is to address "inactive or abandoned
disposal sites that contain hazardous substances, and pose the greatest
risk to public health and the environment." 110 Proponents of the
national uniform standard claim that this strong national interest
satisfies the first factor of the Kimbell Foods test."' "With respect to
the first factor, uniformity in enforcement of CERCLA is necessary
and appropriate in light of the important-perhaps critical-national
problems that CERCLA addresses." 112 "CERCLA presents a national
solution to a nationwide problem. One can hardly imagine a federal
program more demanding of national uniformity than environmental
protection." 113
In addition, proponents of the federal rule argue that state law
"would subject the strong federal interest in enforcement of
CERCLA's national remedial program, as well as the federal
financial interest in prompt recovery of response costs and
replenishment of the Superfund, to the vagaries of several different
107. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 362, abrogating
Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d 1260.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 68 AM. JuR. Trials § 1 (1998).
11I. Clarke, supra note 103, at 1311-12.
112. Id. (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 1312 (quoting In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass.
1987)).
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bodies of law." 114 Consequently, states could affect and even
diminish the federal funds, which are necessary to ensure timely and
effective clean up of these hazardous sites not only in their own state,
but also in other states. 1 5 Moreover, "enforcement of CERCLA is
especially necessary because hazardous sites often present problems
and dangers that cross state lines and demand remedial attention at
the federal level.
'' 16
Uniform federal rule proponents also claim that the creation of
such a rule would be consistent with Supreme Court decisions that
have declined to fill statutory gaps with common law principles
rather than state law."i7 In United States v. General Battery, the Third
Circuit analogized the necessity of a national uniform standard for
CERCLA successor liability to the Supreme Court's requirement of
uniform federal definitions for "employee" and "agent" under the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.118 The court also emphasized that these Supreme Court
federal common law rules were decided after O'Melveny and
Atherton." 9 "'[T]he resulting federal rule, based on a body of case
law developed over time, is statutory interpretation pursuant to
congressional direction,' not the free-wheeling creation of federal
common law.'
120
Indeed, the Supreme Court's prior application of general corporate
law may indicate a reluctance to rely on state law. 12 1 In General
Battery, the Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court "explicitly
declined to resolve the circuit split on whether CERCLA borrows a
particular state's law of indirect corporate liability."'122 "If anything,
Bestfoods cuts in favor of a uniform federal standard. BesOfoods
applied 'fundamental' and 'hornbook' principles of indirect corporate
114. Id. at 1312 (citations omitted).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005).
118. Id (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754-55 (1998)).
119. Id. at304-05.
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liability, not the law of any particular state.', 12 3 This application is
particularly significant because the Court of Appeals had applied
Michigan law, but the Supreme Court declined to, opting to discuss
common law principles of corporate veil-piercing. 124 "The Court's
reliance on the general standard is a different matter than borrowing
the law of a particular state."
'125
Nonetheless, while General Battery relies on the lack of discussion
of state law in Bestfoods to support its federal uniform rule, it ignores
an important statement in Besifoods.126 "CERCLA is. . . like many
another congressional enactment [sic] in giving no indication that the
entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply
because a plaintiffs cause of action is based upon a federal
statute. 1 27 Further, The Rules of Decision Act provides that "[t]he
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of
the United States."'128 Moreover, "state rules of decision will furnish
an appropriate and convenient measure of the governing federal
law."
29
In addition, "[t]he enactment of a federal rule in an area of national
concern, and the decision whether to displace state law in doing so, is
generally made not by the federal judiciary, purposefully insulated
123. United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v.
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61-62 (1998)). In Bestfoods, the United States Supreme Court held that a parent
corporation may be liable under CERCLA for its subsidiary's actions only when the corporate veil may
be pierced. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 62-63. While the Court noted that a corporation may be indirectly
liable for the actions of another corporation, it did not rule whether state law or uniform federal rule
should determine whether the corporate veil had been pierced. Id. at n.9. The Court recognized the
"significant disagreement among courts and commentators" regarding which law to apply, but declined
to answer the question because none of the parties challenged the Sixth Circuit's holding that the
respondents had not incurred derivative liability. Id. As a result, the choice of law question was not
presented in the case, and so the Court "[did] not address it further." Id
124. Gen. Battery, 423 F.3d at 300.
125. Id.
126. United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 54 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 63).
127. Id.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000); Sisk & Anderson, supra note 53, at 508-09 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1994)).
129. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir.
1998) (quoting Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1457-58 (9th Cir. 1986)).
[Vol. 24:561
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 576 2007-2008
576   I E SITY   [ l. :  
 te.,,123   
l  t    
  
  124  rt's 
   
 rti l r state.,,125 
l , ral  
/ t  
t t/ . 126   . .  
  
    
f   
atute.,,127    ] e 
    ,   f 
     
 f 
tes.,,128    
 i t   i t    i   
la .,,129 
 t     
,    
 
  
. .  -- 8».   
 ' t   
 i r . stf s,  . . t --63. il  t  rt t  t t  r r ti    i i tl  
li l  f r t  ti   t  ti , it i  t l  t  t t  l      
s l  t r i  t r t  r r t  il   i r . I . t . .  t i  t  
"significant disagreement among courts and co entators" regarding ic  l  t  l ,  
   
t   t i  i ti  .   ,  
r t  i  t  ,   t  t i  t   t .  . 
. n. tt ,  .  t . 
. d. 
.   .  . )  
. d. 
.  . . .   ;   ,   - {)9 . .  
». 
. t i ,   t   . . .   , .,   
 . . ., »  
16
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol24/iss2/7
STATE LAW AND CERCLA LIABILITY
from democratic pressures, but by the people through their elected
representatives in Congress."' 130 The Supreme Court has also noted
that "[t]he presumption that state law should be incorporated into
federal common law is particularly strong in areas in which private
parties have entered legal relationships in the expectation that their
rights would be governed by state-law standards.... Corporate law is
one such area."' 31 Furthermore, parties seeking judicial imposition of
a federal uniform standard bear heavy burdens "in proving the need
for uniformity or proving that state rules conflict with federal
policy."'
132
In addition, the Supreme Court's explicit "statements in Bestfoods
and O'Melveny demonstrate that to justify the creation of a federal
rule, 'there must be a specific, concrete federal policy or interest that
is compromised by the application of state law."1 33 Further, Kimbell
Foods and O'Melveny suggest that "[tlo invoke the concept of
'uniformity' . . . is not to prove its need.' 34 Efficiency does not
constitute such an identifiable and specific interest. 35 The Supreme
Court has stated:
That Congress has not chosen the most comprehensive or
efficient method of attacking the problem of hazardous substance
discharges, however, is no reason to depart from the language of
the statute. Moreover, while we agree with New Jersey that the
overall purpose of a statute is a useful referent when trying to
130. Sisk & Anderson, supra note 53, at 508 (citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312-13
(1981)).
131. New York v. Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 208 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Kamen v.
Kemper Fin. Services, 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991)).
132. Atchison, 159 F.3d at 362.
133. United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 54 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding no conflict in the application of
state law and the statute's federal interest). "Although O'Melveny and Atherton involve a different
federal statute [than CERCLA], the underlying analysis is applicable in any situation in which it is
necessary to determine whether state law should be supplanted by judicially created federal rules of
decision." Atchison, 159 F.3d at 362.
134. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 220 (1997).
135. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 371-72 (1986) (holding that legislative history was
inadequate to allow CERCLA to reimburse state fund expenditures for all state government cleanup
efforts).
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decipher ambiguous statutory language, remedying the Nation's
toxic waste problems as effectively as possible was not the sole
policy choice reflected in CERCLA. t
36
The Supreme Court also stated in O'Melveny that "[u]niformity of
law might facilitate the FDIC's nationwide litigation of these suits,
eliminating state-by-state research and reducing uncertainty-but if
the avoidance of [these] ordinary consequences qualified as an
identifiable federal interest, we would be awash in 'federal common-
law' rules.',
137
Further, the Court noted that "there is no federal policy that the
fund should always win. Our cases have previously rejected 'more
money' arguments. ' 38 Accordingly, while a uniform national rule for
imposing CERCLA liability may simplify its litigation and reduce
uncertainty as to the applicable rule of law, this effect likely will not
constitute a qualified identifiable interest.
1 39
2. Frustration of Specific Objectives of the Federal Program
Proponents of the uniform national standard claim that the
application of state law "would frustrate the specific health, safety,
and environmental objectives of the statute. The hazardous waste
problem that CERCLA addresses is widely recognized as posing a
serious and imminent threat to public health and the national
environment.' 140 If there were no uniform national standard, then
"CERCLA aims [could] be evaded easily by a responsible party's
choice to arrange a merger or consolidation under the laws of
particular states which unduly restrict successor liability.''
However, this assertion relies on the two premises that states will
be motivated to undermine the enforcement of CERCLA and that
136. Id.
137. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994).
138. Id.
139. Seeid.
140. Clarke, supra note 103, at 1314.
141. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1988).
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states will significantly differ in their imposition of successor
liability. 14  In fact, "[n]o state provides a haven for liable com-
panies... [and] [i]t is unrealistic to think that a state would alter
general corporate law to become a peculiarly hospitable haven for
polluters." 143 Judge Cornelia Kennedy of the Sixth Circuit noted:
Any fears that states will engage in a "race to the bottom" in
their effort to attract corporate business and enact laws that limit
vicarious liability are in my opinion groundless. States have a
substantial interest in protecting their citizens and state
resources. Most states have their own counterparts to CERCLA
and the EPA and they share a complimentary interest with the
United States in the enforcement of laws like CERCLA that are
used to remedy environmental contamination. I see no necessity
to create federal common law in this area to guard against the
risk that states will create safe havens for polluters.
144
Even the Third Circuit, which has imposed a national uniform
standard, specifically agreed that "[a]s a general matter ... it is
unlikely that states would attempt to immunize their corporations
from CERCLA liability. ' 145 Rather, the Third Circuit reasoned that
the federal interests of reducing transaction costs would be
frustrated. 146 The court explained, "incorporating variable and
uncertain state successor liability standards would increase signifi-
cantly CERCLA litigation and transaction costs-in conflict with the
statutory interests embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 9622, which aims to
encourage early settlements, and § 9607(r), which aims to facilitate a
142. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1502 (11 th Cir. 1996) (stating
that "[w]e do not foresee states enacting more protective statutes in an effort to defeat CERCLA's goal
of having the polluter pay.").
143. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir.
1998).
144. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
145. United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2005).
146. Id.
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liquid market in [transferring and redeveloping contaminated
property] .
In the alternative, if states did create overly lenient laws that would
shield successor corporations from CERCLA liability, the Supreme
Court has held that "specific state rules that are unreasonable,
aberrant, or hostile to federal interests will not be applied."' 48 There-
fore, "[a]dequate means are thus available to insure the protection of
the federal interests protected by CERCLA without creating a federal
common law of corporations.'
149
Aside from this lack of motivation for states to create pollution-
friendly havens for corporations, their laws regarding successor
liability are largely uniform. 150 "If state law varied widely on the
issue of successor liability, perhaps the need for a uniform federal
rule would be more apparent. This is not the case, however, as 'the
law in the fifty states on corporate dissolution and successor liability
is largely uniform."' 151 Nonetheless, in General Battery, the Third
Circuit noted the different approaches to successor liability, stating
that:
[A]lithough the general doctrine of successor liability is "largely
uniform" under state law, this uniformity is less apparent when
the general standards are applied in specific cases. Beneath a
veneer of uniformity, the "entire issue of successor liability... is
dreadfully tangled, reflecting the difficulty of striking the right
balance between the competing interests at stake.
5 2
147. Id.
148. Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1250 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 479
(1979)).
149. Id.
150. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 363 (9th Cir.
1998).
151. Id. (quoting Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1249 (Kennedy, J. concurring)).
152. United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 301-02 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted)
(finding that "[s]tate law does vary substantially on the issue of successor liability, and its
unpredictability counsels in favor of CERCLA uniformity.").
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However, different approaches to successor liability do not
necessarily yield different results.153 The United States even admitted
that successor liability is largely uniform amongst the fifty states in
an amicus curiae brief filed with the Ninth Circuit in support of a
federal uniform rule.154 Further, the uniform federal rule, which the
Third Circuit has adopted and the Ninth Circuit has abrogated,
consisted of the same four traditional exceptions found in a majority
of states that permit successor liability.' 55 Accordingly, this federal
rule "mirror[ed] the traditional successor liability rules of most states
,156
3. Disruption to Commercial Relationships Created by State Law
Proponents of the national uniform standard believe that "it is
unclear whether a uniformed federal rule of successor liability in
CERCLA action 'would disrupt commercial relationships predicated
on state law.' 157 While a federal rule would obviously affect
business transactions traditionally governed by state law, this effect
would depend on the substance of the law rather than its mere
existence. 158 In addition, these proponents claim that most state
successor laws are conservative, which would limit the federal
government's ability to reach the assets of former potentially
responsible parties, replenish the superfund, and devote recovered
funds to new cleanup projects.
159
Even if the federal rule was more liberal in permitting successor
liability than most state common law rules, the principal effects
of such a federal rule on commercial relationships would be
153. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 43.
154. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
155. See generally Atchison, 159 F.3d at 361; Gen. Battery, 423 F.3d at 303-04.
156. Atchison, 159 F.3d at 362.
157. Clarke, supra note 103, at 1313 (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729
(1979)).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1313-14.
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increased diligence among successors in evaluating the
hazardous activities of their predecessors and inclusion by
successors of strong indemnification provisions in purchase
agreements.
160
The proponents of the national uniform standard concede that such
a rule would limit the ability of states to protect successor
corporations by freedom of contract or corporate veil law.16' They
contend that these effects are "outweighed by the congressionally
recognized need to enforce uniformly a national remedial program
implicating important federal rights and interests.' 62 However, the
Third Circuit formulated its federal common law principle in
accordance with the majority of the states, and so this law affords the
"proper respect to commercial relationships predicated on the
majority [of] state law[s].
Nevertheless, parties have relied on their state's corporate law in
conducting their transactions. 164 The Sixth Circuit noted that "[tihe
prices paid by the buyers to the sellers in those transactions
undoubtedly reflect[], in part, the parties' understanding concerning
who retained the seller's liabilities."' 65 In addition, commentators
note that "[c]orporations negotiated numerous acquisitions and asset
purchases long before CERCLA was enacted and, even afterward,
continued to structure such transactions in reliance on state law."' 66
This reliance would prove particularly disruptive to commercial
relationships because CERCLA provides for retroactive liability as
well. 167  Consequently, a federal rule would "upset settled
expectations and unfairly deprive commercial actors of their justified
reliance on state law governing corporations, mergers, [and] transfer
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1314.
162. Id.
163. United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 304 (3d Cir. 2005).
164. See, e.g., Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
165. Id.
166. Sisk & Anderson, supra note 53, at 571.
167. ld. at n.419.
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of liabilities .... ,,168 In addition, besides affecting buyers and sellers,
this change would unfairly affect lenders, suppliers, shareholders, and
customers.
169
Further, the creation of a federal rule will create uncertainty in
future transactions and may provide a different answer for CERCLA
liability than other liabilities. 170 In fact, this uncertainty could
actually chill the sale of assets from financially instable corporations,
thereby reducing private revenue, which could have been used to
finance cleanups. 171
CONCLUSION
Because CERCLA was a quickly passed "eleventh hour
compromise, ' 72 courts have been forced to define many of the
statute's provisions. 173 In addition, because CERCLA is a federal
statute governing corporations, which are state creatures,' 74 courts
have been faced with the question of whether to apply state law or
create a uniform federal rule to determine if a successor corporation
should be liable for its predecessor in an asset sale.
175
If the Supreme Court is faced with which law to apply, it will
likely apply state law because there is no clear congressional
directive, 176 and the Kimbell Foods test does not support a national
uniform standard. 177 While CERCLA's sponsor stated that the bill
provided for the development of federal common law, this notion is
not further substantiated by any statutory text or committee reports. 1
78
Further, even if this statement manifested congressional intent, it is
168. Id. at 571-72.
169. Id. at 572.
170. Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1250-1251 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171. Sisk & Anderson, supra note 53, at 572.
172. 68 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (1998).
173. Id
174. See Sisk & Anderson, supra note 53, at 552-53 (citing Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922
F.2d 1240, 1248-49 (6th Cir. 1991)).
175. E.g., New York v. Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2006).
176. See discussion supra Part IlI.A.
177. See discussion supra Part lII.B.
178. See discussion supra Part llI.A.
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insufficient to overcome the O'Melveny presumption that
unaddressed matters in complex federal statutes are left for the
states. 179 Accordingly, the Supreme Court will likely have to apply
the Kimbell Foods test.1
80
First, the enforcement of CERCLA has no need for national
uniformity in determining successor liability. 18 1 CERCLA gives no
indication that state law should be displaced, and displacement is the
traditional role of Congress-not the courts. 182 The presumption of
state law is particularly strong when private parties have entered into
legal relationships. 183 Therefore, there is no specific identifiable
federal interest of CERCLA that conflicts with state law on successor
corporate liability.' 
84
Second, there is no frustration of a federal interest in applying state
law, because most states' laws regarding corporate successor liability
are already consistent. 185 No states currently provide havens for
polluting corporations and most likely never will. 186 However, if a
state were to create such a haven, the Supreme Court will not apply
state rules that are unreasonable or hostile to federal interests.187 In
addition, some of the uniform federal rules that have been created to
provide for successor liability under CERCLA are the same rules that
a majority of states use anyway.1
88
Finally, the imposition of a federal standard may disrupt
commercial relationships that have been predicated on state
commercial law. 189 While the federal uniform rule may mirror many
of the states' successor liability rules it would affect those states
which have different rules.' 90 Consequently, new law would be
179. See id
180. See id.








189. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
190. See id.
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imposed on the parties to transactions in these minority states, even
though they entered these transactions understanding their state's
former law on each party's liability and not a federal common law.'
9 1
Such a change would also create uncertainty and may even require a
different liability regime for CERCLA than other corporate
liabilities. 192
Therefore, after considering the lack of congressional directive in
CERCLA and applying the Kimbell Foods test, the Supreme Court
will likely hold that CERCLA successor liability claims in asset sales
will be governed by state law. Accordingly, the EPA will finally
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